miums by him and upon the continued observance oil his part of certain express witrranties, or conditions, prescribed in the policy, but all the beneficial interest in the contract, ol the side qf the instired, has been transferred finally and forever, either gratuitously or for a valuable consideration, to Aiaother or to others. The policy is no longer subject to claims of future creditors of the insured, nor subject to his power of disposal.
Upon his death it will constitute no part of his estate. His executors or administrators will hiave no authority to inventory it, nor will they be able to c0llect its proceeds. In short, to employ. the usual phraseology applicable to such a policy, the rights of the third party beneficiary are said to be "vested" from the very moment of the issuance qf the policy.:, With full consent of the insurance company, the contract of insurance, from its very inception, is, in a sense, a contract made between the company and the beneficiary i the insured, in a meastire, is a stranger to the contract, and if, at any time, the beneficiary wilfully causes the death of the insured, the beneficiary wjll forfeit all his right under the policy. 4 VWith respect to our first named class of policies, many Courts, il apcordatice with the cardinal doctrine that insurance is a contract of highest good faith, maintain that, though the policy be silent on the subject, the interest of the insured must be held forfeited, if it appear that, either intentionally or by felonious act, he has hastened the event insured against, to wit, his own death.- But it is of importance to take note that, in no one of these -cases in the highest court, were the claims of third party beneficiaries involved.
There was no adequate presentation of authorities, and presumably no argument addressed to the Court, in support of the superior rights of innocent appointees. In every instance the insurance was payable to the estate of the insured, and to plaintiffs whose rights were measured by those of the insured. Thus in the Federal case last cited, the Court expressly states, "The question before us, and the only question is: what rights did McCue's estate and children get by this policy", and accordingly, in distinguishing from the Wisconsin case, whicb was decided in favor of third party beneficiaries," the Court says, "McCue's policy was in favor of his estate, and comes within the concession made by the Supreme Court (of Wisconsin) to the reasoning of the Ritter case."
In the often cited case of Fauntleroy,9 decided by the House of Lords in 1830, the Lord Chancellor, referring to death at the hands of public justice, says, "it is not within the risk of the policy".
Nevertheless, with this and other cases before them, the Queen's Bench found no difficulty in granting judgment in favor of a wife, although the insured, her husband, had intentionally killed himself when sane. ' Indeed when we come to marshal the many authorities, both cases and text-books, which are directly in point, we find a reered by a contract of insurance is the crime of the insured. There is an implied obligation on his part to do nothing to wrongfully accelerate the maturity of the policy", Burt v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 187 U. S., 362, 365. And again, "It must be held that the death of the assured, if directly and intentionally caused by himself, when in sound mind, was not a risk intended to be covered, or which could legally have been covered by the policies in suit", Ritter v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. (1897), 169 U. S., 139, 160. And again very recently the same court, after quoting from the Burt and Ritter cases, says, "These cases must be accepted as expressing the views of this Court as to the public policy which must determine the validity of insurance policies, and which they cannot transcend even by explicit declarations, much less be held to transcend by omission or implication", Northwestern Life Ins. Co The wife was a beneficiary for value, having paid premiums, but if a policy does not "cover" the risk, an assignee for value, no more than a gratuitous assignee can make successful claim. markable unanimity of opinion in favor of third party bencficiaries, especially if the appointment is irrevocable." Says the Pennsylvania Court: "We are clearly of the opinion that the weight of authority is to the effect that, where the policy is silent as to suicide, it will not for such act be avoided as against the wife of deceased, who is the nominated beneficiary."' 1 Says the Supreme Court of Iowa:
"W'e wish now to add a few words on principle by way of emphasis of a thought already expressed.
It is not the wrongdoer who makes claim here, nor any representative whose rights are to be measured by those of the wrongdoer, but persons who acquired an interest at the time the policy was taken out, and who are not in any way responsible for the loss under it."'"
The modern text writers, all or substantially all, seem to follow the cases just presented, and to announce as established law the doctrine for which they stand.' 4 This striking consensus of authority, as it seems to me. is further reinforced by the weight of reason.
It would appear that much of the confusion attaching to this subject has resulted from use of the misleading phrase, "the policy does not cover suicide or crime." Such a statement is not altogether accurate. If we refer to the unambiguous import of the description, the language of the policies, which we are considering, does cover, since all deaths are covered save those specifically excepted, and in many policies there is the additional statement that the policy constitutes the entire contract.
The issue might better be defined in these words, "has the particular claimant a right to recover under the policy ?" Not only, then, by the terms of the contract has the company agreed to pay, but the company so understands the sitnation, and by advertisements and oral representations, the country over, constantly points to the liberality of its form of policy. which it describes as substantially incontestable, and thereby attracts to itself immense custom.
The insured, if you please, has been won over by such representations. For a long term of years his whole family have felt the pinch and stress involved in keeping up the insurance.
In a very real sense, wife and children have contribtfted to the payment of premiums.
They are not only owners for value, but are wholly free of offense. The vesting of their title to the insurance fund antedates the wrongful act perpetrated by another.
Why should the Court, as against them, impose a forfeiture, which the contract itself does not demand, and thus deprive them of their means of support, and possibly force them into the poorhouse? Unless compelled by some urgent consideration of public policy, the Court cannot create an implied condition which is at variance with the express terms of a contract.
What then is the imperative consideration of public policy, that is to work such apparent hardship, laying such a grievous penalty on the innocent, and bringing such extraordinary and unexpected profit to the insurers? Is it that otherwise the insured may be encouraged to commit suicide and crime? That same argument may be urged against the universally accepted laws of inheritance.
And as to crime, is not the argument too far-fetched to be taken seriously? -Might we not about as well contend that it is against public policy to encourage insurers to secure the unjust conviction of innocent suspects? Does anyone suppose that the wrongdoer committed crime with an intent to hasten his own death?
Did he not fight for his life in the criminal court, to the limit of his means and ability ? Ile did not kill himself, nor had he any thought of his insurance when he was drawn into sin.
The State killed him. Why should the State consider the continuance of his life as a thing so valuable, and the welfare of his suffering family as a thing to be held so cheap?
The important institution in this country, known as "life insur-.ance", is, in some respects, akin to a huge charitable fund, established mainly for the benefit of unfortunate wives and children. Suppose such an eleemosynary institution has been founded by private charity and for such a worthy purpose.
M-lust the Courts adjudge the foundation void, so far as it opens its doors to the innocent and needy wives and children of those who have committed suicide, or who have died in the electric chair?
Such a ruling would be brutal and unchristian in the extreme. Our thought instinctively revolts against it. But life insurance is not a pure charity.
To the life insurance fund, very often, wives and children have made -large contribution in money, toil and sacrifice.
Their title to the fund became vested prior to the commission, of the crime.
What difference should it make, whether the insured was killed by his own act, or by the act of some stranger or by accident?
It must not be forgotten, in this connection, that policies of life insurance are often utilized in the market as a means of procuring loans of money. If the rights of an assignee for value are likely to be cut off by events over which he has no control, the commercial value of the instrument will be seriously impaired.
The age is progressive. Courts are striving to get into close touch with the life and needs of the common people.
This interesting issue as to third party beneficiaries, with vested rights, has never been passed upon by the United States Supreme Court, and when, in the future, that high Court of Justice shall have occasion to decide it, I venture to express a doubt as to whether the dictum of Mr. Justice Hunt in the Terry case may not be preferred to the dictum of Mr. Justice McKenna in the recent case of McCue.
George Richards. New York City.
